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# How to choose the OS in a multi-core Safety Certification context?

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## Agenda

# **1 – Why Multi-core?**

**2** – Regulation

# **3 – Multi-core Interferences**

# 4 – Which OS Type?

# Why Multi-Core?

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## **Consolidation of legacy single-core systems**

- Expected Benefits
  - Solve Hardware Obsolescence
  - Reduces Space, Weight, Power and Cabling (SWaP-C),
  - Reduces BOM costs
  - Move to an IMA (Integrated Modular Avionics) approach
    To aggregate applications with different lifecycle, for example
- Possible Constraints to be Managed for Consolidation
  - Legacy OS and associated applications coming from different equipment
  - Can be heterogenous (OS, OS version, Different Standard Conformance, etc.)
  - Mixed-Criticality may exist (Partitioning may then need to be demonstrated)

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# **Necessity for Computing Power**

- Expected Benefits
  - More computing power than a single core
  - Provision for growth

- Use Cases
  - Image Processing
  - AI/ML (Artificial Intelligence / Machine Learning) mainly Linux based
  - Predictable maintenance capabilities

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# **Regulation Framework**

## FAA and EASA Funded Research

 FAA-funded project "Microprocessor Evaluations for Safety-Critical, Real-Time Applications: Authority for Expenditure No. 43" (AR-06/34, AR-08/14, AR-08/55, AR-10/21, AR-11/05).

http://www.faa.gov/aircraft/air\_cert/design\_approvals/air\_software/media/06-34\_MicroprocessorEval.pdf

http://www.faa.gov/aircraft/air\_cert/design\_approvals/air\_software/media/11-5.pdf

http://www.faa.gov/aircraft/air\_cert/design\_approvals/air\_software/media/AR-10-21.pdf

EASA-funded project 2011.C31 "MULCORS" Report.

http://easa.europa.eu/safety-and-research/research-projects/docs/largeaeroplanes/MULCORS Final Study Report EASA.6-2011.pdf

# **MULTI-CORE CERTIFICATION GUIDANCE**

Multi-core certification guidance

- EASA CRI and FAA CAST-32 paper (2014)
- EASA CRI and FAA CAST-32A paper (2016)
- FAA AC (upcoming) / EASA AMC 20-193 (2022)

AC/AMC 20-193 aspects covered are

- Software Architecture Planning
- Planning and Setting of MCP Resources (configuration)
- Interference Channels and Resource Usage
- Software Verification
- Error Detection and Handling, and Safety Nets
- Reporting of Compliance with the Objectives

### **AMC 20-193 Objectives**





Produced in conjunction with ConsuNova Inc

### CAST-32A Objectives: Software Verification RAPITA



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# **Multi-core Interferences**

# **Multicore Hardware Safety Concerns**

### Hardware Shared Resources

- Caches
- Memory controllers
- Interconnect (coherency) module
- I/O Devices

### **Possible Mitigations**

- Avoid sharing, completely
- Avoid sharing at the same time
- Share at the same time (Assuming WCET computation is achievable)



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# Which OS Type?

### Start by a Preliminary Software Design





## Look for the Right Operating Software Model



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### Unsupervised AMP



## **Unsupervised AMP**

- Use case support
  - All use cases can be supported (because it can include different OSes)
  - But it all depend on hardware capabilities

### Interference Mitigation

- Pushed on the hardware itself
- Avoid resources sharing unless interferences impact can be assessed within WCET
- Easier with multiple memory controllers and/or "clusters of cores"
- Mitigation can be put in place by hardware configuration via the bootloader or by a "Safety Island" micro-controller

## **Supervised AMP**

- Use case support
  - All use cases can be supported (because it can include different OSes)
  - But it all depend on hardware capabilities

### Interference Mitigation

- Pushed on the hardware itself
- Avoid resources sharing unless interferences impact can be assessed within WCET
- Easier with multiple memory controllers and/or "clusters of cores"
- Mitigation can be put in place by hardware configuration via the Supervisor
- The Supervisor can provide some error management on resource usage violation



### Virtualization



# Virtualization

- Use case support
  - All use cases can be supported (because it can include different OSes)
  - Hardware capabilities are key, but Software mitigations can also be applied

### Interference Mitigation

- Pushed on the hardware itself and on the Hypervisor
- Avoid resources sharing unless interferences impact can be assessed within WCET
- Easier with multiple memory controllers and/or "clusters of cores"
- Mitigation can be put in place by hardware configuration via the Hypervisor
- The *Hypervisor* can provide some error management on resource usage violation
- The Hypervisor can perform some monitoring on resource usage
- The Hypervisor can put in place a time partitioning to control access to resources

SMP



### **SMP OS**

- Use case support
  - Limited to what the single SMP OS supports (because only one OS present)
  - Hardware capabilities are key, but Software mitigations can also be applied
- Interference Mitigation
  - Pushed on the hardware itself and on the SMP OS
  - Avoid resources sharing unless interferences impact can be assessed within WCET
  - Easier with multiple memory controllers and/or "clusters of cores"
  - Mitigation can be put in place by hardware configuration via the Supervisor
  - The SMP OS can perform some monitoring on resource usage
  - The **SMP OS** can provide some error management on resource usage violation
  - The **SMP OS** can put in place a time partitioning to control access to resources

# **Resource Control – Simple Mapping**

- Direct mapping to all Partitions
- Resource and interference management:
  - Guest OS Level
  - Write synchronized cooperatively among guests
  - Read-Only access

Caveat:

- Must have full hardware documentation to assess impact
- Not all resources can allow this



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# **Resource Control – Split Model**

- Virtualization is applied to each Guest OS
- Resource and interference management:
  - Hypervisor

Caveat: introduces overhead



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# **Resource Control – Split Model**

- Virtualization is applied to each Guest OS
- Resource and interference management:
  - SMP OS Kernel Level

Caveat: introduces overhead



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## **Resource Control – Client / Server**

- Direct mapping to server guest
- Sharing by client-server model using

Virtualization

Caveat: Can typically introduce latencies



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### **Key Takes Away**

- The choice of the OS has an impact on who will be in charge of the multi-core certification aspect
- Addressing AC/AMC 20-193 is typically an iterative process looping around:
  - The selection of the MCP configuration
  - The identification of the interferences induced by shared resources
  - The mitigation of such interferences
- In the course of such looping process, the software architecture selected can evolve to cope with/ease the multi-core certification
- Thinking in advance about the multi-core certification aspects can avoid making strong changes later in the project lifecycle

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## Impact of the OS Type Selection

- Does it meet functional and specific project requirements?
- Who needs to take care of the addressing AC/AMC 20-193?
  - Bootloader supplier
  - BSP/Drive Supplier
  - OS Supplier
  - IMA Platform Supplier
  - System Integrator
  - Some of the above
  - All of the above
- Does Robust Partitioning Demonstration bring any value?

Do you have enough information from the Hardware and the OS Supplier?
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### **Device Drivers Models**

### DIRECT ACCESS

- Hypervisor exposes hardware resources to Guest OS
- Native drivers in Guest OS
- Exclusive access

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Highest performance



### EMULATED

- Hardware fully managed by Hypervisor, or virtual HW
- Native drivers in Guest OS
- Hypervisor intercepts HW access
- Sharing managed in Hypervisor



### PROXY ACCESS

- Direct access to hardware for one Guest OS as I/O server
- SafeIPC used to access I/O server from other Partitions

